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INTRODUCTION
Over of the course of one week in April, 1978, the American broadcaster
NBC televised the five-part nine-and-a-half hour miniseriesHolocaust: The
Story of the Family Weiss. The miniseries attempted to narrate the story of
the Holocaust in its entirety through the eyes of two families: the bourgeois,
German-Jewish Weiss family, and the ethnically German Dorf family, whose
father is a leading member of the SS and an architect of the “Final Solu-
tion.” Screenwriter Gerald Green employed the two families and the variety
of characters whom they encounter to tell a wide-ranging narrative that
touched upon nearly all major events and historical figures of the Holocaust
– from Kristallnacht, to euthanasia, to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and fi-
nally to mass murder at Auschwitz. The series featured an array of actors on
their way to fame: James Woods as Karl Weiss, Meryl Streep as his ethni-
cally German wife Inga, and Michael Moriarty as the bureaucrat and later SS
officer Erik Dorf.
Holocaust differed greatly from the newsreels of the immediate post-
war period, which most audiences saw in movie theaters and through the
distancing lens of black and white photography, as well as later films, which
avoided direct representations of the more horrible aspects of the Holocaust.
Instead,Holocaust brought a modicum of often harsh realism (tonally, if not
always historically) into the intimate setting of the home. Furthermore, in a
break with previous representations of the Holocaust, it focused primarily on
Jewish victimhood and the “Final Solution.”
The American broadcast of Holocaust reached approximately 120 mil-
lion viewers, or roughly half of the nation’s population; created a media-
controversy about representations of the Holocaust in the context of
commercial television; galvanized public interest; and directly preceded,
and may have encouraged, the creation of the Holocaust Memorial Com-
mission, which later led to the founding of the United States Holocaust Me-
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Noting the major success of Holocaust in America, West German tele-
vision purchased the miniseries on April 28, 1978. This acquisition was not
without controversy, primarily due to the American authorship of the film,
and the commercial nature of the NBC miniseries.1 By January 1979, West-
deutscher Rundfunk (WDR) had broadcast the series in the Federal Repub-
lic (FRG) to an audience of 20 million, roughly one-third of the West
German population, and one-half of the adult population.2 Much like the
American broadcast, the West German broadcast received extensive media
coverage, increased public interest in the Holocaust, and preceded the po-
litical debate about the statute of limitations for war crimes, which threatened
to end all trials of Nazi war criminals in December of 1979.
Although the American and West German relationships to the Holocaust
vary greatly, these two countries prove particularly apt for a comparison of
the effects of Holocaust. For one, similarities in the states of Holocaust re-
membrance in 1978/79 in the United States and the Federal Republic allow
comparisons by providing a contextual common ground. Through a com-
parison of methods of presentations by broadcasters, responses from the
media, effects on the public, and broader implications in the political sphere,
it becomes clear that though America and Germany displayed striking sim-
ilarities in the breadth of response, Germany’s role in the Holocaust forced
a greater depth and intensity of response in the FRG. Furthermore, America’s
emotional and geographic distance from the Holocaust allowed a greater de-
gree of debate about artistic representations of the Holocaust, rather than
the event itself. Through this comparison, the decisive importance of iden-
tity in the process and ritual of Holocaust remembrance comes to the fore,
whether that identity (be it experienced or inherited) is victim, perpetrator,
or neutral bystander.
HOLOCAUST IN CONTEXT: STATES OF MEMORY IN 1978/79 IN AMERICA
AND WEST GERMANY
In order to understand the importance of Holocaust in both the United
States and the Federal Republic, one must first assess the state of Holocaust
remembrance and the role of television in both countries at the end of the
1970s. On balance, both countries, following longer periods of silence, had
begun a process of renewal that allowed for the production and broadcast of
Holocaust, but in whichHolocaust remained a catalyzing agent due to its use
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of new forms of representation and the vast audience it received.
By the late 1970s, both cultural and political events had primed memory
culture in the United States forHolocaust, among Jews and non-Jews alike.
American Jews, in particular, had begun a process of rediscovering the Holo-
caust as a focal point for American-Jewish memory and identity. As Holo-
caust survivors entered middle age, they began a renewed process of
self-discovery in part driven by their American progeny.3 This shift marked
a key departure from the earlier relationship between Jewish-Americans and
the Holocaust, a relationship once characterized by silence. In the postwar
period, the pressure of assimilation into American society had pushed the
Holocaust and the notion of Jewish victimhood into the background of Jew-
ish-American consciousness.4 Political events also catalyzed an increased
drive to commemorate the Holocaust among American Jews. The 1967 Six
Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1976 Entebbe Operation, in
which the Israeli Defense Forces rescued Israeli hostages from a hijacked Air
France plane in Uganda, awakened fears among Jewish-Americans of a new
“Holocaust” in Israel.5 Holocaust, which focused almost exclusively on Jew-
ish victimhood, therefore arrived at a high point of Holocaust remembrance
in the Jewish-American community.
Political events and pop culture had also increasingly prepared American
non-Jews for Holocaust. In 1977, the National Socialist Party of America
had planned to march in Skokie, Illinois, a town with a large Jewish and
Holocaust survivor population. The well-publicized court battle between the
town’s government, which sought to ban the march, and the American Civil
Liberties Union, which defended the civil rights of the party, effectively
brought the Holocaust back onto the front pages of American newspapers
and American public consciousness from mid-1977 to early 1978.6,7 A sim-
ilar uptick took place simultaneously in representations of the Holocaust in
American culture. Films like Voyage of the Damned (1976) and Julia (1977)
focused for the first time primarily on Jewish suffering in the Holocaust and
won significant critical acclaim.8 These cultural and political events had thus
already brought at least the notion of Holocaust remembrance to American
non-Jews by the time of broadcast.
A miniseries totally unrelated to the Holocaust enabled the lengthy nar-
rative representation of the Holocaust with an emphasis on Jewish victim-
hood. The 1977 ABC television miniseries Roots, which chronicles one
family’s journey through slavery beginning in Africa and ending in Civil
War-era United States, introduced America to the docudrama format with
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highly socially conscious and ethnocentric content. At the time of its broad-
cast, each of the seven episodes of Roots landed in the top fifteen television
programs of all time, ranked by audience size, despite the fact that the film
followed a primarily African-American perspective.9 America’s television
broadcasters observed that the success of the mainstream and commercial
Roots indicated thatHolocaust could center on primarily Jewish victimhood
and yet still reach a largely non-Jewish audience.10 Furthermore, it allowed
for the depiction of horror and tragedy in the context of commercial televi-
sion – though the commercial aspect of Holocaust’s broadcast later elicited
major criticisms from the media and public.
By 1979, West Germany had also begun a process of renewed examina-
tion of the Nazi past, following long periods of silence, suppression, and
taboo. Although these trends of repression in Germany continued after 1979,
a cultural shift preceded and enabled the broadcast of Holocaust and em-
phasized its relevance. Much like the American culture of Holocaust re-
membrance, the German Erinnerungskultur (culture of memory) developed
as a result of external events (e.g. the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961) and
internal changes (e.g. the development of the student protest movement in
the late 1960s). Memory in the Federal Republic also began with a thorough
suppression of Holocaust remembrance, empty acknowledgments of guilt,
amnesty for many former National Socialists, and an emphasis on German
victimhood (roughly 1945 to 1960).11 The highly televised trial of Adolf
Eichmann in 1961, the parliamentary debate in 1965 on the continuance of
legal prosecutions of German war criminals, also known as the Ver-
jährungsdebatte (debate on the statute of limitations for war crimes), and
the student movement of 1968 all contributed to a new critical examination
of the Nazi past in West Germany. Simultaneously, “Auschwitz” became
codified as synonymous with German guilt. Over the course of the 1970s,
domestic events in the Federal Republic, such as the rise of the left-wing
terrorist group Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in 1977, pushed direct refer-
ences to National Socialism and the Holocaust to the periphery, but the use
of “Holocaust” and “Third Reich” as points of reference in public and po-
litical discourse continued unabated, often in connection with these events.12
Nevertheless, while politics and generational shifts brought National So-
cialism back into public discourse, the emphasis remained on German per-
petrators and not victims.13 The so-called “Hitler-wave” of the late 1970s, a
greatly renewed obsession with films and books about the Third Reich and
artifacts from the period, typified this perpetrator-centric Erinnerungskul-
Transatlantic Broadcasts80
tur.14 In this regard, West German memory culture, much like its American
counterpart, had prepared itself forHolocaust, even as the film’s content re-
mained novel in the German context.
Television programming in West Germany provides both a glimpse into
the cultural state of remembrance in 1979, as well as a major point of con-
trast with the American broadcast. Wulf Kansteiner has identified three pri-
mary types of programming related to the Holocaust from the 1950s up
through 1977: artificially philosemitic documentaries, films imported from
Eastern Europe about survival, and films about the rescue of Jewish vic-
tims.15 These films highlighted German victimhood, the notion of resistance,
and continued survival, while ignoring many of the awful realities of the
Holocaust. Holocaust thus did not directly break these trends in West Ger-
man filmmaking; however, it did significantly expand on a nascent genre of
victim-oriented Holocaust programming. This shift in programming trends
parallels to a great degree the shifts in American programming embodied
by Roots, as well as films directly addressing the Holocaust.
Understanding the broadcast ofHolocaust in Germany also requires
an explanation of the West German television landscape, which differed
greatly from American commercial television and which significantly af-
fects further comparisons between the two broadcasts. Commercial televi-
sion did not exist in West Germany until 1984, five years after the initial
broadcast ofHolocaust.16 In its place was public television, which consisted
of three channels, each geared to a different audience. The “Third Channel,”
also known as WDR, broadcasted “special” and long-form programming,
and was responsible for the broadcast of Holocaust in January 1979.17 The
absence of commercial television had two major consequences for the Ger-
man broadcast of Holocaust. Firstly, public television rendered criticism of
commercialism moot in the German context, allowing the German media to
debate other aspects of the film. Secondly, and crucially, the decision to
broadcastHolocaustwas inherently political because German television sur-
vived on public funding. Although these two points of contrast do not ren-
der a comparison of the American and German broadcasts impossible, it is
important to keep in mind the repercussions of broadcasting Holocaust on
public television.
Despite the vast geographic and emotional differences between the
cultures of Holocaust remembrance in the United States and the Federal Re-
public, they resemble one another to a remarkable degree around 1978/79.
By the time of the broadcast of Holocaust both nations had begun a renais-
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sance of open discourse about the Holocaust in political and cultural forums.
This striking parallelism speaks greatly to the function of memory for vic-
tims, perpetrators, and the many neutral actors of the United States: the urge
to forget is sometimes universal. However, this parallelism speaks more to
the Federal Republic’s avoidance of its past, and general trends in Holocaust
remembrance, which appears to develop in waves. In effect, the Federal Re-
public, the land of the perpetrators, took as long as the United States, a coun-
try with a very small portion of people who had experienced the Holocaust
in any concrete way, to develop a serious interest in the Holocaust.
PRESENTING HOLOCAUST IN AMERICA AND WEST GERMANY
By 1978/79, political and cultural events had created a climate in which
a major TV network could produce a nine-and-a-half hour miniseries pri-
marily about Jewish suffering in the Holocaust, and which nearly one-half
of all Americans and one-third of all West Germans took the time to watch.
For their parts, however, both American and West German broadcasters at-
tempted to make Holocaust an event, pushing the effects of the miniseries
beyond the confines of television and into public education. The difference
between NBC’s efforts versus those ofWestdeutscher Rundfunkwas the tim-
ing of much of the non-broadcast activities. While NBC made great efforts
prior to the broadcast of Holocaust, likely attempting to drum up viewer-
ship, WDR provided forums after the broadcast to answer questions view-
ers might have about the miniseries or the Holocaust and National Socialism
in general. As a result, West German audiences, though slightly smaller, re-
ceived a more in-depth and historically grounded picture of the events por-
trayed on-screen.
NBC’s efforts in presenting Holocaust as an event included extensive
advertising, educational guides, novelizations, cooperation with Jewish as
well as Christian religious groups, and special timing to coincide with events
of the Holocaust as well as the Jewish calendar. The clearest sign of NBC’s
commitment to bringing Holocaust to as large an audience as possible was
its advertising campaign. In 1978, the network aired more commercials for
Holocaust than it had for any other single program.18 Furthermore, as part of
its educational approach, NBC published one million study guides for dis-
tribution by teachers’ organizations and Jewish and Christian organizations,
including the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith and the National
Council of Churches.19 Additionally, Gerald Green, the film’s screenwriter,
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wrote a novelized version of the film of which Bantam Books published one
million copies two weeks prior to the broadcast.20 NBC also declared the
first day of the broadcast, Sunday, April 16, to be “Holocaust Sunday” to
usher in a week of “thought and reflection.”21 The timing of the broadcast
also echoed the centrality of Jewish victimhood in the film by coinciding
with the Jewish calendar: NBC aired Holocaust the week before Passover
and the final episode coincided with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the War-
saw Ghetto uprising.22 The considerable amount of resources and thought
NBC poured into the broadcast of Holocaust is not only astounding from a
modern perspective, it was also remarkably effective in attracting viewers.
Like NBC, WDR began preparations for the broadcast ofHolocaustwith
more in mind than the television programming itself. When West German
television officials negotiated for broadcasting rights toHolocaust, they con-
sciously emphasized the cultural and educational importance of the minis-
eries. Jochen Stinauer, who negotiated the film’s purchase, maintained that
officials were “conscious of the importance of ‘Holocaust’ and of the value
it can have for the German people.”23 This sense of responsibility to the ma-
terial pervaded the West German presentation of the miniseries. In the same
mold as American study guides, 25,000 study guides were published in the
Federal Republic prior to the broadcast, though post-broadcast orders in the
amount of 255,000 quickly overwhelmed publishers.24 In addition to study
guides, WDR tried, and was largely successful, in balancing the fictionalized
story with the work done by historians. Federal and local government agen-
cies involved in education also held seminars and distributed additional ma-
terial to cover aspects of the Holocaust not shown in the miniseries.25 For
example, two fact-based documentaries on the “Final Solution” accompa-
nied the initial broadcast on WDR.26 Furthermore, following each episode,
the WDR hosted Midnight Discussions, a kind of forum for viewers to in-
teract with survivors, sociologists, historians, and psychologists, ask ques-
tions, and make comments about each night’s episode.27 In total,
approximately 35,000 West German viewers, or roughly four times the num-
ber of callers to U.S. television stations, took up the WDR’s offer and called
in during the post-show broadcasts.28 Even viewers who did not call in ben-
efited from the programming: around half of the public that watched each
episode, or about ten million viewers, stayed up to watch Midnight Discus-
sions.29
In comparison to NBC’s massive effort to expand viewership, the re-
sources used by WDR appear rather minimal. However, despite the relative
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lack of breadth in WDR’s presentation of Holocaust, the level of depth and
in particular the encouragement of active viewer participation following
each broadcast allowed for a greater degree of self-reflection. The West Ger-
man context, in which many viewers had either direct or indirect connections
to National Socialism via friends and family members, likely necessitated
this communal self-reflection and precipitated the high level of viewer par-
ticipation. Nevertheless, the American presentation, which commercial con-
siderations largely fueled, likely could have reached a similarly large
audience with post-broadcast programming. As it turned out, American
viewers still sought forums for public debate, but through other media.
HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN AND WEST GERMAN MEDIA
In the week of the broadcast and even in its aftermath, the media of both
the United States and the Federal Republic provided key forums for public
discussion and directed debate about the miniseries, both as a work of art and
as an educational tool. The ways in which the American media and German
media differed in their direction of debate especially highlight the particu-
larities of Holocaust remembrance in each country. While almost academic
debates about aestheticizing and trivializing the Holocaust raged in Ameri-
can newspapers, West German newspapers reacted in generally more posi-
tive ways to the broadcast, not because of the film’s aesthetic worth, but
because of its role as a catalyst for Holocaust remembrance. Above all, this
disparity in media responses reflects the greater inherent meaning of Holo-
caust remembrance as an end in West Germany, while the American media
treated Holocaust remembrance as a means, a vehicle for teaching univer-
sal lessons.
In the American media, critical responses to Holocaust were divided es-
sentially into two camps. The first camp, best represented by Elie Wiesel, a
Holocaust survivor and author of the acclaimed memoir Night, as well as a
small group of television critics, criticized the film for poor artistic quality,
lack of sensitivity, and crass commercialism. Elie Wiesel took the first major
shot atHolocaust, and his words took on greater meaning given his personal
experience in Auschwitz-Birkenau and Buchenwald, as well as his public
role in shaping the American discourse on the Holocaust. In his critique of
Holocaust, which appeared on the first day of the American broadcast,
Wiesel called the miniseries “untrue, offensive, [and] cheap,” lamenting its
lack of historical authenticity, unfaithfulness to those involved, and its
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doomed attempt to portray the unportrayable.30 John O’Connor, the regular
TV critic for The New York Times, echoed Wiesel’s critiques while raising
yet another: he claimed the mixture of commercial breaks with historical
tragedy inherently causes a “process of diminishment.”31 These critics of
Holocaust justifiably found much to fault in the melodrama, the compro-
mises of historical fact, and commercialism of broadcast. In their minds,
these faults alone preclude Holocaust from functioning as an effective or
beneficial teaching tool, despite the clear mass commercial success of the
broadcast.
The second camp, which Time columnist Frank Rich best represented,
defended the film for its utility as a teaching tool. In this view, the artistic de-
ficiencies and inherent commercialism of the film were simply lesser evils
in the face of the vast audience Holocaust reached, who otherwise would
never have had significant knowledge of the event. Rich wrote in Time:
[N]o TV show or movie, including this one, can make an au-
dience feel what it was like to be a Jew caught in the Holo-
caust: only those who were there can ever know. But
Holocaust does a lot to increase our comprehension of its
unfathomable subject…Holocaust attaches human faces to
the inhuman statistics of mass murder. It envelops the audi-
ence in grief and suffering, and long after the show has
ended, the pain does not easily go away.32
Like Rich, those critics who came out in support of Holocaust tempered
their praise with statements about the inability to portray truthfully the hor-
ror and tragedy of the Holocaust within the limitations of television. Nev-
ertheless, they all saw the benefits of reaching a mass audience and
encouraging self-driven research on the Holocaust.
The critical debate surrounding Holocaust lasted in America through
May 1978, and was itself a landmark in America’s culture of Holocaust re-
membrance. The very fact that a major newspaper like The New York Times
dedicated significant coverage to the subject of the Holocaust, whether Elie
Wiesel’s critique, Gerald Green’s rebuttal, or the many letters to the editor
published in a special section, indicates the public’s interest in the continu-
ing debate, and the media’s receptiveness to a continued discourse on the
Holocaust.33 The Los Angeles Times even published an article about the les-
sons of the Holocaust on the human condition, questioning whether Amer-
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icans could have been guards at the death camps.34 Although such articles
necessarily engage in a process of universalization, they do indicate that the
media had a clear interest in exploring the Holocaust further. Whether or not
Holocaust succeeded as a work of art, it successfully created a lively dis-
course in the media about Holocaust representation, Holocaust memory, and
the lessons the Holocaust might have for today.
Unlike the American media, which extensively debated the aesthetic and
educational worth of Holocaust, the West German media focused primarily
on the effects of the miniseries on the public and its meaning for continued
Holocaust remembrance. However, the media, though difficult to charac-
terize as a single entity, did not generally begin with an eye to the historical
and political implications of Holocaust, instead characterizing the minis-
eries prior to its broadcast as overly commercial, aesthetically questionable,
a trivialization, and a kind of American intrusion into a German, or at least
European, matter. Nevertheless, while some in the media criticized the
miniseries directly, many used American critiques such as Elie Wiesel’s as
a kind of proxy, or muted their criticisms.35
Many of the criticisms during the heavy pre-broadcast media coverage
gave way to highly positive post-broadcast reactions on the educational and
political utility of the miniseries. The development from harsh critique to
almost wholesale acceptance is best illustrated by Der Spiegel. The West
German newsweekly published several highly critical articles prior to the
West German broadcast, one with the sardonic title “Gas Chambers à la Hol-
lywood.”36 Immediately after the broadcast of Holocaust, Der Spiegel pub-
lished a cover story about the miniseries entitled “‘Holocaust’: The Past
Returns,” and subtitled the “Murder of the Jews Moves the Germans.”37
Across the board, German media spoke of how Holocaust “broke through
thirty years of apathy”38; brought the past to light “more memorably than
ever”39; and visualized the “crimes committed in the name of Germany in a
way that shook millions.”40 The criticisms about the poorly executed aes-
theticization of the film and the commercialism behind the film’s production
did not wholly disappear, but they did become insignificant in light of the
film’s impact on German society. Aggregately, of 449 critiques of the minis-
eries in daily and weekly news-outlets, only 27% received the miniseries
negatively, while 16% were ambivalent, and 57% overtly positive.41 Al-
though the majority of positive reviews was hardly overwhelming, the small
minority of negative reviews indicates the level of trepidation with which
West German media approached the strong public responses, and the impli-
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cations thereof. Perhaps more significant was the continued coverage of the
Holocaust in the press, in articles about the death camps and the German
role therein, for example.42 The renewed impulse of Holocaust remembrance
in the media of the Federal Republic, spurred by the film, continued for the
next several months.43
When compared with one another, American and German media re-
sponses put in stark relief the themes in each nation’s Holocaust remem-
brance. While American media focused on almost academic subjects like
the aestheticization and trivialization of the Holocaust and the lessons that
one might draw from the Holocaust for an American context, the German
media faced the task of bringing the Holocaust to a population in a sense
duty bound to Holocaust remembrance. In Germany, the stakes were higher
and the themes less abstract, while American media had the luxury of flex-
ibility in the absence of historical obligation. Furthermore, universalization
and “lessons” of the Holocaust achieved greater importance in America, a
country where connections to the Holocaust are indirect and often tenuous.
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO HOLOCAUST IN AMERICA AND WEST GERMANY
Reactions toHolocaust by audiences at large in the U.S. and the FRG re-
semble one another greatly in breadth, but to a lesser degree in depth. Much
as with the media, however, American viewers disagreed as to the aesthetic
and educational worth of the miniseries, while West German viewers over-
whelmingly supported the miniseries for its historical and educational im-
plications, with a small minority of negative opinions responding with
anti-Semitism or open calls to repress the Nazi past.
The American public reacted in a variety of ways towards the broadcast
of Holocaust in 1978, reflecting the broad cross-section of the American
public that the miniseries reached and often emotionally moved. American
viewers often entered into a well-informed dialogue with newspapers, con-
ducting debates with television and cultural critics through letters to the ed-
itor. Letters to American newspapers, written both by Jews and non-Jews,
provide an effective entrée into the quality of public responses, and those that
appeared in the American press in late April and early May do effectively in-
dicate that the miniseries became a phenomenon beyond the bounds of tel-
evision. Letters to the editor in The New York Times often debated Elie
Wiesel’s review and Gerald Green’s response, or noted the lessons drawn
from the miniseries and its resulting controversy. One respondent wrote that
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“the series…opened up on a broad front the entire racist issue and its mean-
ing to us today.”44 Meanwhile, one letter praised NBC for having “the
courage to stir up this controversy” despite the faults of the miniseries.45 In
one representative letter, a Jewish-American viewer mentioned how her
nine-year-old son could not watch more than one episode due to its horror,
but “he will never again forget the Holocaust.”46 A strong thread of emo-
tionality runs through the letters, regardless of their stance on Holocaust.
More than any other source, these letters show that the Holocaust, the event,
or Holocaust, the television broadcast, had emotional resonance with an
American audience despite geographic or ethnic distance from the events.
What letters to the editor can tell us about the tone is echoed in opinion
polling data taken in the aftermath of the broadcast. Although it is difficult
to gauge accurately the wide berth of responses among American viewers,
opinion polls show that the film was primarily effective in reaching a young,
Christian audience, which had not previously learned extensively about the
Holocaust. In a poll conducted by the American Jewish Committee, 60% of
respondents felt that the film helped them better understand Adolf Hitler’s
treatment of the Jews, and roughly 75% of respondents said that the film
provided “an accurate picture of Nazi anti-Semitic policies.”47 The poll also
found that nearly half of all viewers still blamed Jewish victims for not re-
sisting enough. Although this response remains puzzling given the prominent
presence of Jewish resistance in the film, the statistics indicate that the film
had a significant impact on the American public’s understanding of the Holo-
caust. If nearly half of all Americans viewed an episode of the miniseries,
than at least one-third of all Americans appeared to have internalized what
they saw portrayed on screen.
Aside from this passive response to Holocaust, the miniseries also
spurred the public to actively seek out more information about the Holo-
caust. Following the broadcast, the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
responded to a flood of inquiries about the Holocaust by putting on an ex-
hibition of documents related to the planning and execution of the “Final
Solution.”48 The most lasting and directly measurable impact of Holocaust
in America’s remembrance of the Holocaust was the creation of the For-
tunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale. As journalist Ju-
dith Miller has noted, survivors in the Connecticut area were “angered by
what they saw as the program’s trivialization of their searing experiences,”
and thus were encouraged to have their memories documented.49 While
Holocaust has by and large disappeared from America’s landscape of Holo-
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caust remembrance, the effect on this small subsection of the American pub-
lic continues to affect modern memory in America.
Public responses in West Germany showed a smaller range of opinion,
though often a greater depth of emotion and a higher level of active re-
sponses, when compared with American responses. In much the same way
that American letters to the editor provide a glimpse into the tone of Amer-
icans’ reactions, the calls to the Midnight Discussions show the range of
West German responses to Holocaust. The first two nights of calls ranged
from the deeply emotional calls about personal experiences to factual ques-
tions about the depicted events.50 The majority of these questions followed
four themes: “Why was there no formal resistance?”; “Why didn’t the
Catholic and Protestant churches do anything?”; “Why didn’t the rest of the
world intervene?”; and “Why were the Jews so passive?”51 In the same vein,
450,000 viewers requested written educational material about the Nazi pe-
riod and the Holocaust from the Federal Center for Political Education.52
More than anything else, the range of factual questions and requests for in-
formation indicate the desire among the West German population for ex-
planations about the development and implementation of the “Final
Solution,” which many appeared not to have seriously considered or learned
about prior to the broadcast of Holocaust.
Another set of openly and latently anti-Semitic responses appeared in
the wake of Holocaust, though significantly fewer in number than the pos-
itive responses. Oftentimes these commentators tried to draw up a balance
sheet of victimhood: they complained about the lack of films concerning the
1945 firebombing of Dresden, the fate of many German POWs in Soviet
prison camps, or the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe fol-
lowing the war.53 Anti-Semitic, far-right statements and motions to suppress
Holocaust remembrance show an aspect of West German response not seen,
or at least not reported, in the American context, most likely due to the ves-
tiges of National Socialism and the difficult process of admitting guilt,
whether individual or collective.
Post-broadcast polling data are particularly instructive for understanding
the quantity of West German responses. Opinion polls found that two-thirds
of all viewers said the miniseries had “deeply moved” them.54 More than
one-third of all viewers were appalled that “we Germans committed and tol-
erated such crimes.” Finally, one-fifth of all viewers claimed to have nearly
cried during certain scenes. Of those polled who did not watch Holocaust,
33% claimed that the miniseries would have been too emotionally affect-
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ing; 28% could not watch the miniseries for unstated reasons; 18% were not
interested in the subject; 22% failed to watch because “one should finally
forget such things”; and 8% because “we don’t have anything to do with
[the Nazi past] anymore.” When Holocaust connected with West German
viewers, it made a lasting impact, inciting active responses. The minority of
viewers who actively refused to watch Holocaust, who did not undergo a
change of heart, or who watched Holocaust already holding anti-Semitic or
far-right attitudes likely hardened their opinions.
The most noteworthy aspect of West German responses was the level of
emotion. In several cases, it was as though West German viewers had never
seen depictions of the “Final Solution” before. Many Americans expressed
their reactions toHolocaust in highly emotional ways, but West Germans re-
acted generally in more active and historically conscious ways – whether
calling into the Midnight Discussions or requesting material from the Bun-
deszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Center for Political Education).
This reflects on the one hand the opportunities for active participation of-
fered in West Germany that Americans simply lacked, and on the other hand
the pressure of identity and “collective guilt.” For the survivors in America
who founded the Fortunoff archive,Holocaustwas a call to action. Similarly,
for many West Germans with connections to the Holocaust, the film cat-
alyzed a great degree of self-reflection. Among the Americans with more
tenuous bonds to the Holocaust or none at all, the lack of non-active re-
sponses remains unsurprising.
HOLOCAUST AND POLITICS IN AMERICA AND WEST GERMANY
The political repercussions of Holocaust in both the United States and
the Federal Republic are particularly illustrative because of the potential for
direct and visible effects in policy. In both nations, Holocaust ushered in
and likely influenced, but did not directly catalyze, an era of increased po-
litical discourse related to the Holocaust.
While the American media debated the merits ofHolocaust and the pub-
lic continued to learn more and more about the event in the aftermath of the
broadcast, the miniseries resonated in significant ways with the American
political elite. However, while Holocaust did become a reference point for
political discussions related to genocide and Holocaust remembrance, it did
not, in most cases, directly influence political decision-making.
The use of Holocaust as a reference point in American politics can be
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seen in the stated motivations of American politicians as well as congres-
sional testimony from the post-broadcast period. For example, Senator
William Proxmire, a Democrat from Wisconsin, mentioned Holocaust in a
plea for the United States to ratify the United Nations Genocide Conven-
tion.55 Similarly, John Danforth, a Republican Senator from Missouri and
the first elected official to draft and sponsor a bill for a national day of Holo-
caust remembrance, stated that the miniseries inspired his congressional pro-
posal.56 In congressional testimony about West Germany’s response to
political terrorism, one expert even referred to Holocaust as evidence of the
“trauma…the Germans are still coping with.”57 More than anything else, this
use of the miniseries as a point of reference indicates the high level of cul-
tural currency that Holocaust had achieved due to NBC’s efforts both on
and off screen.
Furthermore, the miniseries had transformed the Holocaust into a kind
of popular and non-controversial topic politically, despite the controversy
regarding the cultural meaning of the miniseries. As Alan Mintz has argued,
Holocaust the miniseries transformed Holocaust the event into a rare point
of moral consensus in American politics – who, after all, would stand in the
way of public Holocaust remembrance in the post-broadcast climate?58 Nev-
ertheless, this moral consensus did not equate direct political action, which
instead resulted due to a number of factors.
The effect ofHolocaust on American politics is best observed in the for-
mation of the Holocaust Memorial Commission two weeks after the broad-
cast. In a ceremony in the White House Rose Garden on May 1, 1978,
President Jimmy Carter announced the formation of the Holocaust Memo-
rial Commission. This commission would go on to create the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum, which opened in 1993 and represented a
defining moment in America’s remembrance of the Holocaust. Due to the
chronologic proximity between the broadcast of Holocaust and the creation
of the commission, it is easy to draw the conclusion that the NBC docudrama
played a significant role in Carter’s decision-making process. Nevertheless,
the primary motivations that led to the creation of the Holocaust Memorial
Commission had much more to do with political and foreign policy consid-
erations. Edward Linenthal, who has closely examined the genesis of the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, identifies the primary reasons
behind the creation of the commission as Carter’s “troubles with the Jewish
community” because of his policy regarding Palestine and arms sales to
Saudia Arabia.59 However, Holocaust did provide added incentive for the
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Carter administration to form the commission. When Stuart Eizenstat,
Carter’s Chief of Domestic Policy, recommended the formation of the Holo-
caust Memorial Commission to the President, he also noted the impact of
Holocaust on American audiences.60 Given the other political factors at work,
it is unlikely that Holocaust tipped the scales in Carter’s decision-making
process. Nevertheless, Holocaust created an atmosphere beneficial to the
work of the commission, ensured the presence of a receptive American au-
dience, and increased the continued viability of the project.
Much like the American initiative to begin the Holocaust Memorial
Commission, West German legislators faced an important policy decision re-
lated to the Holocaust almost directly after the broadcast of Holocaust. And
similarly, while Holocaust influenced policymakers, it likely did not tip the
scales in the decision-making process. Significantly, however, the Holocaust
became a major point of reference and a major part of West German mem-
ory-politics following the broadcast of the miniseries.
The debate on and ultimate abolition of the statute of limitations of Ger-
man war crimes, also known as the Verjährungsdebatte, provides the major
parallel with Carter’s executive order to found the Memorial Commission.
The implications of this particular legislative battle in the Bundestag, how-
ever, go far deeper than the implications of Carter’s order. As with the found-
ing of the commission, it is important not to overestimate the effect of
Holocaust on the Verjährungsdebatte. For one, the Bundestag had discussed
the statute of limitations on war criminals twice before, in 1965 and 1969,
and both times decided to continue prosecutions via legislative compro-
mise.61 Thus, German lawmakers had already set a legal precedent for treat-
ing war criminals with a separate set of judicial tools, and for extending
rather than discontinuing prosecutions of war crimes. Furthermore, the
United States, Israel, and Poland all exerted pressure on the FRG to elimi-
nate the statute of limitations, and their political demands had already proven
decisive in the original debate of 1965.62
Nevertheless, two aspects of the 1979 debate indicate thatHolocaust did
indeed play an important, if not ultimately decisive, role in the decision-
making process of the Bundestag. Firstly, the voting patterns of party mem-
bers indicate individual shifts away from the party line, perhaps as a result
of Holocaust. The debate ended on July 3, 1979, when the Bundestag voted
253 to 228 to abolish the statute of limitations for crimes of murder and
genocide.63 As Jeffrey Herf has noted, the voting patterns of the 1979 debate
indicate an actual increase in conservative opposition to ending the statute
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of limitations, as most of the voting occurred along party lines – the Social
Democrats (SPD) supporting further investigations and the Christian De-
mocrats (CDU) and Free Democrats (FDP) voting to enforce the statute of
limitations. However, without the votes of the 38 Christian Democrats who
crossed party lines, the SPD would not have successfully won this legisla-
tive battle. The extent to which Holocaust influenced these members of the
Bundestag remains a mystery. PerhapsHolocaust created a climate favorable
to the further prosecution of war criminals and greater self-reflection on a
political level. However, among the speeches available today, none make
mention of the docudrama or its effect on public opinion in the Federal Re-
public.
Secondly, prior to the broadcast ofHolocaust, West German public opin-
ion was aligned against extending the statute of limitations – most Germans
were disinterested, uninformed, or flatly opposed to further prosecutions.64
The effects ofHolocaust on German public opinion as seen in the public re-
actions likely did not go unnoticed by politicians. For its part, the West Ger-
man media linkedHolocaust thematically with the Verjährungsdebatte, often
publishing articles about the miniseries directly next to articles about the
debate.65 It is likely that members of the Bundestag, prodded in part by the
media, made the same connection between the miniseries, the shift in pub-
lic opinion, and their own votes.
A much clearer connection can be made between the broadcast of Holo-
caust and the following era of increased historical awareness in West Ger-
man politics. Drawing from the lessons of Holocaust, West German
politicians in the early 1980s, and in particular Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a
trained historian, began a campaign to address directly issues of German
identity in a post-Holocaust nation.66 Rather than suppress collective-mem-
ory of the National Socialist past, Kohl began a process of creating “post-
conventional” German national identity based around public acts of
remembrance.67 The media controversy and public response toHolocaust in
1979 fostered and allowed the kind of political discourse that Kohl would go
on to popularize in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Even if Holocaust failed
to affect legislation directly, the miniseries catalyzed changes to West Ger-
many’s political atmosphere.
Given the more positive media responses and the deeper public responses
toHolocaust in West Germany than in America, it follows that West German
political actors would react more dynamically and in more obvious ways
than Americans. In both cases, however, the extent to whichHolocaust truly
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influenced policy remains questionable, if slightly less so in the West Ger-
man case. The most striking difference between political effects in America
and West Germany is the degree to which Holocaust remembrance emerged
as a consensus issue. While American politicians began to use the Holocaust
as an almost non-political consensus issue, in a way playing the role of hero
in the Holocaust narrative, West German politicians had to treat Holocaust
remembrance in highly politicized ways due to internal pressures, primarily
from the right. As politicians of the United States and Federal Republic set
off on a course of memory-minded political decisions, West Germans in-
herently faced more domestic difficulties in pushing proposals through the
government. While the Carter administration ultimately clashed with mem-
bers of the Holocaust Memorial Commission, the barriers in his way were
inherently smaller than those in front of West German politicians. The effects
of Holocaust then, though comparable, differ greatly once put into each na-
tion’s political context.
CONCLUSIONS
From a superficial standpoint, the broadcasts of Holocaust in America
and Germany would appear inherently and vastly different due to the his-
torical contexts. Most Americans had little to no connection to the Holo-
caust, and while some American Jews could draw on the Holocaust as a
focal point for group identity, only the tiniest minority experienced the Holo-
caust directly. By contrast, virtually the entirety of West German society had
a direct connection to the Third Reich, and thus at least an indirect connec-
tion to the Holocaust.
Indeed, the politics of identity informed to an immense degree the re-
ception to the broadcasts of Holocaust. Most Americans could debate the
appropriateness of the portrayal of the Holocaust because, for many, the
event itself appeared as a kind of historically grounded parable, rife with
lessons, but from another time and another world. Furthermore, the minis-
eries provided a point of contrast for American identity and self-definition,
which has always been bound up with notions, if not realities, of freedom,
democracy, and civil rights. By contrast, the West German relationship to the
past was grounded in the collective memory of an event committed by fel-
low Germans and upon native soil. The reverberations of the Holocaust in
public and political discourse shook and shaped West Germany, and con-
tinue to today. The more deeply emotional and more active reactions among
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West Germans to the broadcast of Holocaust are a direct result of this sense
of identity and link to the Nazi past.
Nevertheless, similarities in the general contours of response – media
controversy, public emotion, political points of reference – indicate two im-
portant things. Firstly, the reactions to the broadcast indicate that events in
collective memory follow similar patterns, even when the context changes.
Secondly, the similarities in the transatlantic impacts ofHolocaust show that
the miniseries itself contained something strikingly new in its depiction of
the titular event. The miniseries demonstrated the high degree of social im-
pact television and other media can have in the post-war age, the continu-
ally changing landscape of Holocaust memory in response to technological
developments, and new horizons of historical depiction. Although depend-
ent on contexts, collective memories, and identity politics, Holocaust: The
Story of the Family Weiss itself bears some measure of responsibility for the
changes in memory culture it accompanied.
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